The marketing firm and the consumer organization: a comparative analysis with special reference to charitable organizations by Foxall, Gordon R. et al.
fpsyg-11-535793 November 19, 2020 Time: 16:38 # 1
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY















This article was submitted to
Organizational Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 17 February 2020
Accepted: 14 October 2020
Published: 25 November 2020
Citation:
Foxall GR, Sigurdsson V and
Gallogly JK (2020) The Marketing Firm
and the Consumer Organization:





The Marketing Firm and the
Consumer Organization: A
Comparative Analysis With Special
Reference to Charitable
Organizations
Gordon Robert Foxall1,2* , Valdimar Sigurdsson2 and Joseph K. Gallogly2
1 Cardiff Business Schooll, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom, 2 Department of Business Administration, Reykjavík
University, Reykjavik, Iceland
The accurate delineation of various forms of business organization requires a
comparative analysis of their objectives, functions, and organizational structures. In
particular, this paper highlights differences in managerial work between business firms
and non-profits exemplified by the charitable organization. It adopts as its template the
theory of the marketing firm, a depiction of the modern corporation as it responds to
the imperatives of customer-oriented management, namely consumer discretion and
consumer sophistication. It describes in §2 the essentials of the theory and its basis
in consumer behavior analysis, and outlines its unique position as the organization
responsible for marketing transactions, based on objective exchange, competitive
markets and prices, and the deployment of the entire marketing mix. §3 deals in greater
depth with the objective, strategic functions, and organization of the marketing firm
in terms of the concepts of metacontingency and bilateral contingency. §4 discusses
how the marketing firm differs from charities in terms of goal separation, market-based
pricing and competition, the entrepreneurial (strategic) process, the pursuit of customer-
oriented management, and organizational structure. Particular attention is accorded
the organizational differences between marketing firms and charities, which arise as
a direct consequence of the distinct patterns of contingency they entail. §5 discusses
the implications of the foregoing analysis and draws appropriate conclusions.
Keywords: the marketing firm, consumer organizations, charitable organizations, bilateral contingency,
managerial work
INTRODUCTION
Customer behavior is nowadays marked by a high degree of choice and sophistication, and a highly
competitive market-place, all of which compel firms to adopt a strategy that has become known as
customer-oriented management (e.g., Huber et al., 2001; Lambin and Schuiling, 2012; Kotler and
Keller, 2015). There are important differences in managerial work between marketing firms, whose
mission is to respond to the “imperatives of customer-oriented management” in order to fulfill
their own corporate objectives, and consumer organizations, which pursue alternative objectives.
These differences have implications for (a) the relationships that internally link members of the
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firm or consumer organization, and (b) those that link the firm or
consumer organization to its external publics. The nature of these
relationships reflects the organizational mission involved and the
approach to strategic management and entrepreneurial policy
enjoined upon the business by its publics. Moreover, these intra-
and extra-organizational relationships can be advantageously
analyzed through the concept of bilateral contingency, which
is a central component of theory of the marketing firm
(Foxall, 1999, 2018, 2020a; Menon, 2020). Although this theory
pertains to a specific kind of business organization, that which
responds to the imperatives of customer-oriented management,
it cannot be defined and analyzed in isolation from other
businesses. The consumer organizations of interest include, in
addition to charitable organizations, social marketing campaigns,
purchasing and marketing co-operatives, partnerships, and
public corporations. The relevance of the theory to the analysis of
managerial work in marketing firms and consumer organizations
depends on an appreciation of its nature as an economic-
psychological construal which draws upon behavior analysis,
microeconomics, and marketing science to portray the modern
corporation. The nature of the marketing firm can be specified
only through this inter-disciplinary synthesis. The overriding
goal of the present paper is to achieve a clearer understanding
of the place and role of marketing in the theory of the firm by
considering the similarities and contrasts between the marketing
firm and other forms of enterprise. The paper also has several
subordinate goals.
First among these is to complement the analysis of consumer
behavior that has taken place through the disciplinary lens
of consumer behavior by presenting a theory of the firm in
similar terms and evaluating it. The aim therefore is also
to ascertain the extent to which the amalgam of behavior
analysis, behavioral economics, and marketing science that
forms the basis of consumer behavior can present a theory
of the firm which complements what we know of consumer
behavior from this source. Second among the subsidiary goals
is to demonstrate the necessity and form of a comparative
analysis of the marketing firm compared with other businesses.
The main goal requires a broader perspective than that of
the firm itself. It must arrive at its conclusions through an
understanding not only of the nature of the firm but also of
other businesses, consumer organizations such as non-profits,
co-operatives, partnerships, and state-owned enterprises. While
the different types of consumer organizations would benefit
from review, this paper concentrates, specifically, on the business
firm in contrast to the charity organization (see Foxall, in
preparation for a broader analysis). How these differ in terms
of goals pursued, the role of the market (prices determination,
competition), the nature of managerial work with respect to
entrepreneurship and strategy, organizational structure, and the
implications of marketing-oriented management. Third is to
exemplify the nature of managerial work in the marketing
firm, again through comparative analysis of strategic goals and
behavior of the firm and the charity. The emphasis here is on
the strategic behavior of the marketing firm, its entrepreneurial
mission. This is found to be lacking in consumer organizations.
Finally, the paper seeks to develop the theory of the marketing
firm by considering the nature of contemporary businesses
compared with consumer organizations such as non-profits, co-
operatives, partnerships, and state-owned enterprises in terms of
their objectives, functions, and organizational structures.
These themes are topical and relevant in light of the sheer
number of theories of the firm that are becoming available, many
of which ignore marketing and, especially, the imperatives of
customer-oriented management. Yet these considerations define
the modern business firm in the context of the imperatives of
customer-oriented management that have been alluded to. We
need to understand this better through comparative analysis –
hence inclusion of the charity. Another note of relevance is struck
by the fact that many of the consumer organizations mentioned
are increasingly referred to as “firms” with no distinction made
between their objectives, functions, organization and that of the
paradigmatic business firm. This is a source of confusion that
cries out for understanding and clear methods of demarcation.
THE MARKETING FIRM: THEORETICAL
BACKGROUND
Consumer Behavior Analysis
The theory of the marketing firm proposes a view of the
firm as a response to the imperatives of customer-oriented
management which is based on an inter-disciplinary framework
of conceptualization and analysis. The components of this
explanatory system are the approach to behavioral psychology
known as behavior analysis, the school of behavioral economics
founded on a fusion of behavior analysis and microeconomics
(Hursh, 1980, 1984), and the empirically based marketing
science of Ehrenberg (1988) and his colleagues. Consumer
behavior analysis (Foxall, 2001, 2002). has been described,
both theoretically in terms of the empirical evidence that it
has inspired, in Foxall (2017) and, accordingly, will be only
briefly portrayed here (for more examples of research using
consumer behavior analysis, see Sigurdsson et al., 2009, and
Foxall et al., 2006). In behavior analysis, a response, R, is
explained by reference to pre-behavioral stimuli that set the
occasion for its performance (discriminative stimuli or SD),
and the rewarding or reinforcing stimuli that have followed
this response on previous occasions (Sr). This paradigm, the
so-called “three-term contingency,” comprises the explanatory
device employed by operant psychology (e.g., Skinner, 1974). An
operant response is simply one that operates on the environment
in order to effect consequences that influence the rate of its
subsequent performance. Not all of these consequences are
rewarding or reinforcing; some, which lead to a diminution
in the rate of responding, inhibit or punish the behaviors
they follow and are known as punishers. We can, therefore,
state the three-term contingency as SD: R Sr/p where SD is
a discriminative stimulus, R a response, and Sr/p a reinforcer
or punisher. The colon suggests a probabilistic relationship
between the setting variable and the response, while the arrow
denotes a determinate outcome. The consumer behavior setting
consists, in addition to SDS, of motivating operations (MO)
which are pre-behavioral stimuli that enhance the relationship
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FIGURE 1 | Summative behavioral perspective model; Foxall (2020a).
between a response and its reinforcing consequences (e.g.,
Fagerstrøm et al., 2010). The depiction of consumer behavior
in these terms has led to the formulation of the Behavioral
Perspective Model (BPM) of consumer choice (Foxall, 1990/2004,
2016a,b,c). In it, the consumer situation, comprising setting
variables weighted by the consumer’s learning history, is
the immediate precursor of consumer behavior (Figure 1).
This interaction of situation and behavior rests upon the
consumer’s prior experience (consumption history) which primes
the setting stimuli, as a result of which particular behaviors
become more probable while others are inhibited (see e.g.,
Sigurdsson et al., 2015).
Hursch’s approach to behavioral economics relies on the
similar functions played by the variables included in behavior
analysis and those of neoclassical microeconomics. A response
is an act of purchase, consumption, or work while a reinforcer
is a positive outcome of these behaviors (a product or service
or a wage), and the relation between them is expressed by a
schedule of reinforcement in behavioral psychology and a price
in the realm of economic behavior. This approach has been
employed in research designed to test the BPM. Importantly,
recent investigations have established what it is that consumers
buy and consume. On the surface of course it appears evident
that they purchase and use the products and services they
acquire in exchange transactions. The BPM proposes that they
consume reinforcers that supply both functional and social
benefits, known, respectively, as utilitarian and informational
reinforcements. One strand of the behavioral-economic research
derived from the model has employed the Cobb-Douglas utility
function, which proposes that consumers purchase combinations
of products or attributes which maximize their returns or
utility within the confines of their income or budget constraint
(Douglas, 1976). A series of empirical investigations indicates that
what consumers actually maximize is combinations of utilitarian
and informational reinforcement (Oliveira-Castro et al., 2015,
2016; Oliveira-Castro and Foxall, 2017). The kind of aggregate
data on consumers’ patterns of consumption revealed by the
work of Ehrenberg (1988), based on sophisticated consumer
panel evidence, has made available the means of testing both the
model and the economic hypotheses drawn from it among large
representative samples of buyers.
BOX 1 | Meaning of “consumerate”
This paper employs the terms customer-, consumer- and
marketing-orientation interchangeably throughout the paper. The
“consumerate” encompasses the customer base of the marketing firm, be it
composed of an aggregation of individual final consumers or a number of
corporate customers. Its members are referred to as “customers” or
“consumers,” these terms being treated as equivalent (Foxall, in preparation).
Delineating the Marketing Firm: The
Marketing Transaction
The marketing firm is defined in terms of the kinds of transaction
into which it enters with customers and suppliers, marketing
transactions, which have four characteristics. The first is literal
or objective exchanges of products or services, usually for
pecuniary benefit; the second is that the exchange occurs in
competitive markets and at market-generated prices; therefore
third, that these are pecuniary markets: barter could conceivably
mark a marketing transaction but this is so rare in normal
corporate-consumer dealings as to make pecuniary markets
a defining factor; and, finally, the transaction involves the
entire marketing mix.
Literal or Objective Exchange
A transaction is “the creation of value by voluntary co-
operation between two or more economic actors” (Spulber,
2009b, p. 12). The value so created is the benefits to the parties
minus the costs of transacting. It is not only firms that incur
transaction costs; consumers do so both when they exchange
goods directly and when they create and run organizations
like clubs, cooperatives, nonprofits, and basic partnerships.
These administrative governance costs arise in the course of
communicating, processing information, searching, matching,
bargaining, moral hazard, adverse selection, free riding, and
contracting (Spulber, 2009b, p. 13). Part of the raison d’être
of the firm, including the marketing firm, is to make possible
transactions for consumers whereby they encounter lower
transaction costs than would otherwise be the case. In order to
succeed, therefore, a firm has to enable transactions at lower
costs than those consumers incur through direct exchange. Firms
whose managers believe they can accomplish this, therefore, have
an incentive to create markets and an organization. A market,
i.e., a means of bringing buyers and sellers together, is created
by a firm by designing institutions of exchange to ensure more
efficient transactions (Spulber, 2009b, pp. 12—13). But to this
we would add that while Spulber sees these functions as those
of the firm, the actual creation of markets is a cooperative
venture between firms and consumers who are willing to enact
transactions with one another. Firms may generally take the
initiative but consumers are active participants to any transaction
and sometimes the initiative itself also lies with them. By
conducting transactions in this way, the firm fulfills what Drucker
defines as its very purpose, the creation of a customer: in fact
we would further add, the creation of a consumerate, a body of
consumers who return to purchase the firm’s output sufficiently
frequently to allow it to achieve its sales and profit objectives.
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BOX 2 | Meaning of “marketing transaction”
A marketing transaction is marked by (i) objective exchange which occurs in a
(ii) competitive market, according to (iii) market-generated prices, and (iv)
employing the full marketing mix of product, price, promotion and place. This
is a contractual relationship between two or more free-acting parties (Foxall, in
preparation).
BOX 3 | Meaning of “mutuality relationship”
A mutuality relationship is a (i) socially based, (ii) non-contractual, and (iii) non
pecuniary relationship; it may involve (iv) informal competition for resources,
time, etc., but (v) carries no marketing considerations. Mutuality relationships
do not involve objective exchange but they do entail reciprocal reinforcement.
Such relationships may characterize interactions among members of a single
organization or those that facilitate more formal exchanges
between organizations (Foxall, in preparation).
Marketing transactions entail literal exchange or transfer
of legal title. A marketing transaction comprises mutual
reinforcement based on literal exchange. In a marketing
relationship based on economic exchange, the mutual
reinforcement is typically accomplished by an item-for-
item switch of valued items. The requirement that marketing
transactions be understood as literal transfers entails that
marketing firms operate in pecuniary markets. Each party to
a marketing relationship provides the other with utilitarian
and informational reinforcement: typically, goods which supply
functional and social utilities are traded for money and marketing
intelligence. The marketing intelligence provided by customers,
information about what they have bought and their experience
of it and their plans for the future provides informational
reinforcement which guides the marketer’s strategic planning
and marketing management activities. The literalness of exchange
in typical pecuniary trading is easily discerned but the question
arises what is actually exchanged in the case of intangibles such
as services: the essence of a marketing transaction is mutual
transfers of legal title to a product or the outcome of a service.
Such exchange is a transfer of property rights (Commons,
1924; Demsetz, 1995; Posner, 1995). Ownership, in the sense
of legal entitlement, and contractual requirements are elements
of the contingencies of rewards and penalties which can alter
behavior, just as the market itself is ultimately a source of
mutually acknowledged and reciprocally binding contingencies
(Foxall, 1999).
Marketing transactions are invariably accompanied by other,
less tightly defined relationships, known in the theory of the
marketing firm as mutuality relationships (Foxall, 1999). These
are social relationships which are characterized by reciprocally
contingent reinforcement but which do not involve literal
exchanges. They are not economic in nature and do not involve
marketing exchanges. They might include, for instance, informal
communications between a salesperson and a customer, possibly
in the form of a social gathering organized by one or other party,
which facilitates mutual interaction (“getting to know you”).
They would also include more formal relationships in which a
salesperson canvassed a prospective customer or a potential buyer
requested product information from a marketing firm.
Competitive (Pecuniary) Markets and Prices
For the most part, public bodies are monopolies or work
amicably and in accordance with similar organizations. In
contrast, firms are rivals with strategic goals and are under
the constraints of antitrust legislation, unless authorized as a
joint venture. These firms require the open market if they want
to pursue marketing orientated management. This allows the
firm to decide, using analyses of current consumer behavior
and projections of future consumer behavior, what its sphere of
operations will be. According to Spulber (2009b), firms require
this freedom, though some organizations, which often claim to
be marketing practitioners are unable to engage in marketing-
oriented management in the ways discussed in this paper. Social
marketing campaigns, for instance, are not firms in Spulber’s
sense because the objectives of the organizations involved do
not differ from those of the owners/members. Bodies engaged
in “social marketing” do not have a product or service which
is literally exchanged in pecuniary markets, or do not use
a competitive price mechanism. By and large, they have an
amorphous output such as “smoking reduction” (rather than a
concrete product or service that can participate in legal transfers
based on financial consideration). Public organizations are often
influenced primarily by state interventions rather than being
able to set prices or determine the focus of their business in
an autonomous fashion. Furthermore, public enterprises do not
necessarily compete for consumers, nor necessarily set prices; nor
yet determine for themselves the business they are in on the basis
of market considerations. Their scope for effecting free exchanges
in unrestricted markets is highly limited to the extent that they are
directed by interventionist government policies.
Deployment of the Whole Marketing Mix
The whole marketing mix, not any specific part of it, generates
sales. The marketing mix is a model, centered on product,
place, promotion and price, used to pursue objectives related to
influencing demand for brands (Borden, 1964). Although there
are examples of firms enhancing their advertising budgets and
thereby increasing their sales, perhaps dramatically, it is not the
case that “advertising creates sales,” as though it existed in a
vacuum that excluded product, price, and distribution utilities.
The essence of marketing as a subject area that is distinct from
economics, sociology, and psychology inheres in its adoption of
the brand as its distinctive level of analysis. This goes beyond
the product which suffices for other disciplines. The brand, over
and above the product, is a matter for the entire marketing mix
to create, communicate, and sustain. No element of the mix –
neither product, place, promotion, or price – can be omitted in
the quest to create a customer. The marketing firm, therefore, by
definition employs the entire marketing mix.
OBJECTIVE, FUNCTIONS, AND
ORGANIZATION OF THE MARKETING
FIRM
Objective
Spulber (2009a,b) argues that the firm differs from other
commercial and social organizations (also described as consumer
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organizations) in having a goal that is different from that of
its owners, namely profit maximization. Firms’ owners, he says
(though other stakeholders may fall into the same category:
Fama, 1980; Mäntysaari, 2012; Foxall, 2020a), have a separate
goal: while they may desire to associate with a profit maximizing
organization, their own goal is consumption. Spulber (2009b,
p. 63) separation criterion is stated repeatedly in his text, though
never more forcefully than in the judgment that a firm is “a
transaction institution whose objectives differ from those of
its owners.”
It can be argued, moreover, that while profit is undoubtedly
important to the marketing firm not immediately of interest to its
stakeholders who remain essentially consumers, it is not maximal
profit that is the marketing firm’s concern. Apart from the well-
known difficulties of measuring the phenomenon of maximized
profit and of knowing when it had been attained, the firm
would require to know its marginal costs and revenues at each
level of production, both those achieved and those potential, a
requirement that for most large-scale organizations is not feasible
(e.g., Kahneman et al., 1986). Rather, it seems likely that the
marketing firm can be best regarded as seeking to maximize
sales revenues subject to a minimum profit constraint, as Baumol
(1967) proposed. Sales revenues are more tractable when it comes
to the firm’s knowing where it stands, means of increasing them
are available in the various elements of the marketing mix, and
as long as sufficient profit is earned to satisfy shareholders and
reinvest in the business, the firm’s tasks of information gathering
and processing are much more straightforward than is the case
for the theoretically elegant but impracticable goal of profit
maximization (Hall, 1967).
Sales revenue maximization seems a more realistic goal to
ascribe to the marketing firm as we have defined it for several
reasons. First, sales maximization nicely combines maximization
with satisficing (in the form of the minimum level of profit
required for the survival of the firm). This is not the amorphous
“psychological and emotional” satisficing that Demsetz (1995,
p.78) speaks of. Rather, it is as precise as human wit can make
it given that information is not perfect and cognitive judgments
are boundedly rational. The profit level aimed at is that which
satisfies shareholders and leaves room for reinvestment in the
business. This is as measurable as it gets. Second, it retains
Spulber’s intent in that it is not an objective shared by the owners
or other stakeholders. Stakeholders may prefer a sales maximizing
firm that can adequately compensate shareholders and reinvest
but their objective remains consumption. Third, it is an aim
which the directors can more nearly approximate than is profit-
maximization since it is easier to detect how to increase sales at
any point than profits since this requires knowing costs as well as
revenues. This modified separation criterion – the “sales—profit
objective” – captures Spulber’s determination to distinguish the
firm from various categories of consumer but is more in accord
with the parameters of corporate performance that directors and
managers are capable of conceptualizing and calculating.
Functions
The Management of Strategic Scope
The managerial work of the marketing firm consists in (i) the
creation of marketing intelligence, (ii) designing a marketing
FIGURE 2 | Strategic Scope defines the marketing mixes the firm can support
and the consumerates it can serve with them; Foxall (2020a).
strategy, and (iii) the implementation of this strategy through
the management of a portfolio of marketing mixes (Foxall, 2018,
2020a). As a whole, these activities comprise the management of
the strategic process and determine the firm’s strategic scope, i.e.,
the range of marketing mixes it can support and the spectrum
of consumerates through whose satisfaction it can achieve its
objectives of survival and sales maximization (Figure 2).
Three demands, each requiring informational inputs and
decision outputs, must be fulfilled by marketing firms: the
Creation of Marketing Intelligence which typically involves market
search and managerial response, reveals the potential (feasible)
strategic scope of the firm given capabilities and resources;
the Formulation of Marketing Strategy, concerned to determine
the planned strategic scope of the firm, namely the markets
it will serve, the marketing mixes with which it will seek to
accomplish this, and expectations of further diversification and
innovation, i.e., the determination of the potential strategic-scope
of the firm, and Marketing Mix Management, the creation and
implementation of the portfolio of marketing mixes through
which the firm will seek to achieve its objectives developed in the
course of the first two stages. This last determines the revealed or
effective strategic scope of the firm.
Before elaborating the procedures involved in these resource-
based operations which constitute the firm’s strategic process, we
reiterate the concept of marketing incompleteness (Foxall, 2020a).
Bylund’s (2016) theory of the firm argues that incompleteness
involves splitting a productive stage generating partly finished
goods for which there is no market: the producer has either to
obtain partly completed inputs in order to complete it in-house
or find a market for a partly finished product which does not
readily exist. This is the source of what he calls the specialization
deadlock since extra-market specialization results in uncertainty,
a state of affairs which accords with Adam Smith’s statement
that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market.
Bylund is predominantly interested in the incompleteness of
productive processes.
Marketing incompleteness is of a different kind. The strategic
scope of the firm depends on the assets, productive and
marketing, at its disposal. Such assets have value only if
they can be protected from plagiarism by competitors. The
tasks they entail may be undertaken as discrete operations
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but they are continuous rather than disjointed, and their
holistic management is vital to the firm’s strategic planning
and determination of strategic scope. They therefore must be
confined (kept within an organizational boundary), classified
(available only to trusted and interested parties), and their
implementation in the market strictly controlled. Marketing
incompleteness is revealed and exploited by means of the
deployment of these assets and the creative uses the firm
makes of them. Market incompleteness is a gap in the market
revealed through market search, evaluated by the application
of marketing intelligence within the strategic scope of the
firm, and responded to through the application/extension
of the strategic scope leading to effective marketing mix
management which makes clear the actual strategic scope of
the firm.
Possible incompleteness in the market is revealed by market
search (confined necessarily within the strategic scope of the
firm, though one would hope with an eye to extraneous
opportunities too). By revealing the feasible strategic scope
of the firm, this stimulates planning based on the fact that
market incompleteness is revealed as a gap in the market which
can be filled by product development, market development,
or diversification. There may be no response necessary to the
intelligence so gathered and evaluated. The creation of marketing
intelligence presents the feasible market scope of the firm.
Having established in this way the opportunities open to it,
the firm can assess its strategic environment by considering
the marketing opportunities available to it and the behaviors of
consumers and competitors. This could be done with the aid of
external consultants and agents. However, planned movement
in any one of these directions reflects a change in the in
the strategic scope of the firm (following on from requisite
decision-making on the basis of marketing intelligence and
planning). This decision-making must recognize that, although
market search was undertaken within the strategic scope of
the firm its results and revealed potentials have now got to
be rigorously reexamined within the capabilities framework
of the organization (Day, 2011). But the planning of future
marketing scope must not be confined within the preexisting
corporate policy and strategy: it ought also to impinge on
and challenge that strategic position so that it is not a static
straightjacket; if necessary the firm’s strategic scope must be
modified and decisions made with respect to the resources
the firm will employ and how it will utilize them. The firm
which has formulated its strategy is in possession of a clear
understanding of its planned strategic scope (Anderson, 1982).
It is now ready for implementation. The firm must design
each of its marketing mixes as a unity of product, place,
promotion, and price. It is the marketing mix that produces
sales, not just any one part of it. It is feasible that external
consultants or agents could assist in this stage. The firm
must also manage its portfolio of marketing mixes as a single
entity (Figure 3). This eventuates in the realized strategic scope
of the firm. Hence, Marketing Mix Management is a more
complex task than “product portfolio management” (see Cooper
et al., 1999) which entails but one element of the marketing
mix (Foxall, 2015a). The marketing firm is the vehicle for
FIGURE 3 | Portfolio of marketing mixes. The strategic scope represented by
the portfolio of marketing mixes which the firm manages determines the
extent to which the firm consolidates its market positions or diversifies into
novel areas. The portfolio must be managed as a single entity. For simplicity,
only two marketing mixes are shown; Foxall (2020a).
identifying and responding to market incompleteness, in the
course of which its strategic scope is inevitably enhanced
through product or market development, and diversification.
Marketing firms undertaking this by, first, economizing on
transaction costs and, second, increasing sales (physical) and
revenues (cash).
Entrepreneurship is involved in all three of these marketing
operations, viewed in terms of both the tasks that they entail and
the (marketing) resources they command. Entrepreneurship may
be defined as, first, the identification of market incompleteness,
second the response to it in light of the firm’s current strategic
scope, and, third, the deployment of appropriate marketing mixes
which ensure that the firm’s overall mix portfolio achieves its sales
and profit objectives. This does not necessarily mean it maximizes
profit, only that it achieves sufficient profit to enable it to invest,
satisfy shareholders, and survive and prosper. Entrepreneurship,
then, is the successful planning of a sufficiently profitable
feasible strategic scope, and the implementation of the decisions
that ensue from this (for research on the Marketing Firm in
entrepreneurship see, e.g., Fagerstrøm et al., 2020; Haddara
et al., 2020). This process – the strategic or entrepreneurial
process – requires. for its inauguration and implementation,
an organization which encapsulates the requisite competences,
namely the marketing firm. In summary, the management of
strategic scope views the strategic process as a single entity,
rather than three disjointed spheres of operation, which as a
whole is concerned with the creation and implementation of
the strategic scope of the firm. Its goal and content is the
portfolio of marketing mixes which constitute the emergent
output of the business organization which influences, first,
consumer behavior and, second, the fortunes of the firm itself
and hence its subsequent behavior. Indeed, the management
of a whole portfolio of marketing mixes in a unified and
harmonious manner is the very embodiment of the firm as a
metacontingency and it rests on the concept of the bilateral
contingencies that define marketing and mutuality relationships
within and beyond the firm.
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Marketing Assets and Entrepreneurial Encapsulation
In the performance of these functions, the marketing firm
internalizes the specialized marketing assets it requires to
cosmpete successfully: these may be largely intellectual but they
are specialized assets nonetheless, and perform the same function
in a theory of the firm as the physical assets of production.
After all, von Mises comments, in the case of production, that
it “is not something physical, material, and external; it is a
spiritual and intellectual phenomenon. Its essential requisites
are not human labor and external natural forces and things,
but the decision of the mind to use these factors as means
for the attainment of ends. What produces the product are
not toil and trouble themselves, but the fact that the toiling is
guided by reason” (von Mises, 1949/2016, pp. 141–2). If this
is true of production, it is all the more so of marketing –
at least as far as the designation intellectual is concerned,
though “spiritual” might be a value-judgment too far in both
cases! The strategic scope of the firm depends on the assets,
productive and marketing, at its disposal, have value to the firm
only if they are protected from competitors. The tasks they
entail may be undertaken as discrete operations but they are
continuous rather than disjointed, and their holistic management
is vital to the firm’s strategic planning and determination of
strategic scope. They therefore must be confined (kept within
an organizational boundary), classified (available only to trusted
and interested parties), and their implementation in the market
strictly controlled. Marketing incompleteness is revealed and
responded to by means of the deployment of these assets and
the firm’s response to them. Marketing incompleteness is first
identified via market search, evaluated by the application of
marketing intelligence within the strategic scope of the firm,
and second exploited by application/extension of strategic scope
leading to effective marketing mix management which reveals the
actual strategic scope of the firm.
The specialized marketing assets integral to this process
consist in the information, intelligence, and knowledge.
Hence, the specialized marketing resources integral to the
strategic process are human and, fundamentally, intellectual:
the entrepreneurs/managers responsible for the discovery
of marketing opportunities and for their planning and
implementation. Each of the stages that comprise the strategic
process has its own intellectual requirements, the outcomes
of which feed into the succeeding stage or the reiteration of
the process: Market Information, which is data with respect
to e.g., behavior of consumers; Marketing Intelligence which
is market data contextualized within the framework provided
by the firm’s strategic capacities and present strategic profile;
and Strategic Knowledge which is marketing intelligence
which leads to the formulation of the potential strategic
scope of the firm.
Bylund’s (2016) argument is that the specialization of
(production) tasks is only achievable within a firm to ensure that
there is a “market” or productive use for the output of subtasks,
the theory of the marketing firm emphasizes the organizational
implications of the specialization of tasks reliant on strategic
marketing information. These might also be readily subdivided
on the basis of a novel division of labor but this is not the
dominant import for the marketing firm. Such knowledge and
the intelligence on which it depends needs to be subdivided
and re-combined and managed holistically within a particular
strategic vision and this state of affairs is likely to be attainable
only within the limits of a particular organization. Management
of the actual and tacit knowledge involved is achieved only within
an organized framework of managerial control in which top
management assumes responsibility for the development of a
marketing-oriented management culture. The sole element in the
process that can advisedly involve extra-corporate inputs is the
(relatively routine) gathering of market data. The further the
firm advances through the strategic process, the more specialized
the assets it produces become, and the greater the need of their
corporate encapsulation. Thereby is provided the rationale of the
contemporary firm, the marketing firm.
Organization
The Marketing Firm as a Metacontingency
It is rare in the marketing literature for consumer behavior
on the one hand and corporate marketing behavior on the
other to be specified and explained in similar terms. An aim
of the theory of the marketing firm has therefore been to
propose a model of corporate response to consumer behavior
within the inter-disciplinary framework on which consumer
behavior analysis is founded. This has an important consequence
for the way in which corporate behavior is portrayed since
behavior analysis is traditionally concerned only with the
behavior of individual organisms, both human and nonhuman.
Any such organism, the behavior of which can be predicted
by reference to the consequences that have previously followed
responses (its learning history) together with the environmental
stimuli that prefigure the kinds of consequences that will
ensue from its imminent behavior (its behavior setting) can
be termed an operant system or a contextual system (Foxall,
1999, 2016c). This designation clearly applies to the consumer.
However, as the theory of the marketing firm has always
proposed (Foxall, 1999), it may also be understood as a
contextual system since its corporate behaviors are controlled
by the reinforcing and punishing outcomes they incur. While
individual’s behavior may be understood through the lens of the
three-term contingency – ideally within an experimental setting –
explaining that of an organization in these terms requires a leap
in conceptualization that comprehends its structure as a system of
what Biglan and Glenn (2013) refer to as interlocking behavioral
contingencies (IBCs).
The supra-individual behavior of the organization viewed as a
unit may be inferred from its generating consequences or outputs
over and above the aggregate behaviors of its members and the
effects of the organization’s behavior, which is greater than the sum
of its parts, on its subsequent conduct. The relationships between
IBCs, their products (or outputs), and the rewarding or punishing
consequences enjoined by their external environments on these
products, are known as metacontingencies (Biglan and Glenn,
2013). Hence, the supra-personal behavior of the marketing firm
consists in the marketing mixes that it generates, launches into
the marketplace, and subsequently manages through their life
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cycles. The accent which the theory of the marketing firm places
on exchange relationships as central to marketing transactions
suggests the mechanism by which the marketing firm and its
customer base are bound together via bilateral contingencies.
The metacontingency concept is a means of describing the
interactions of individual consumers with firms, and of firms with
other firms, as based on interwoven contingencies.
The import of this is that the marketing firm differs from many
other commercial and social organizations not only by virtue
of goal separation but also insofar as it has an output that is
over and above that of the aggregated outputs of its members.
This output, the marketing mix, is a set of discriminative stimuli
(see Tarbox and Tarbox, 2017) and motivating operations that
seeks to engender consumer behavior that is beneficial not only
to the consumerate (in the form of utility maximization) but
also to the firm (in the form of revenues and profits). Other
organizations such as many cooperatives, partnerships, and social
marketing campaigns have a goal which is identical to that of
their members and an output that is the combined outputs
of the membership. The kind of organization represented by
the marketing firm is known as a metacontingency by reason
of its have a superordinate behavioral output; its behavior,
in putting out a marketing mix that is greater than the
combined outputs of its members, may therefore be described
as superordinate behavior. The behavioral output of the other
organizations is known simply as macrobehavior. There is a
crucial distinction. Behavior analysis usually takes the individual
subject as its subject matter and insofar as the behavior of an
individual is predictable from the three-term contingency, it may
be understood as an “operant system.” The selection by the
environment of the behavior of this individual has implications
for the evolution of its behavior: behaviors that are reinforced
are selected while those that are punished tend to die out. We
are here treating an organization as an operant system. In the
case of a metacontingency, its behavioral output is subject to
selection by the environment in such a way that it evolves; this
is not the case for macrobehavior. In the case of organizations
whose output consists in macrobehavior, the concept of operant
system applies only to its individual members; in the instance
of a metacontingency, the organization at its center or hub
is the operant system. The nature of a metacontingency can
be better understood by considering it as a nexus of bilateral
contingencies, and what Figure 3 therefore depicts is the
corporate metacontingency as a nexus of bilateral contingencies.
The concept of the marketing firm rests on a distinction
between the behavioral outputs of organizations that are
metacontingencies and those of collectivities of persons who
form the firm’s customer base (Biglan and Glenn, 2013; Foxall,
2015a,b) Thus the idea of a firm as a metacontingency derives
from its behavioral output having emerged from, but existing
over and above, the combined actions of its members, rendering
the output of the metacontingency qualitatively different from
the aggregated behaviors of its affiliates. Such metacontingent
corporate behavior evolves in its own right as its consequences
are selected or deselected by the environment, in this case by
the firm’s customers and potential customers, who respond to
the marketing mixes it presents. The behavioral output of the
FIGURE 4 | Bilateral contingency: the fundamental structure of a reciprocal
relationship; Foxall (2020b).
firm’s consumers is, in contrast, the aggregated consequences
of their several actions. It may be possible to measure and
statistically analyze this behavior but it does not thereby become
an entity in its own right: it is simply combination of individual
operant responses (Biglan and Glenn, 2013). This combined
behavior does not therefore evolve: its increase or extinction is
not sensitive to its environmental consequences since it produces
no behavioral outputs that can be acted on by a selective
environment. Biglan and Glenn (2013) describes these aggregated
actions of a large collectivity as macrobehavior.
The marketing firm, however, generates a supra-personal
output, the marketing mix – not just a product but a fusion
of product and non-product elements by which the firm
attempts to influence demand and which, acting as a single
entity, may create a customer. The kind of firm we are
considering is only competent to market successfully if it
employs all four elements of the marketing mix in optimal
fashion. Social marketing campaigns by contrast rely heavily on
persuasive communication – in fact for many this is the sole
element of the marketing mix employed. The deployment of a
communications strategy is not marketing and clearly it does not
entail marketing mix management.
Bilateral Contingency
The concept of bilateral contingency, introduced by Foxall
(1999), captures the relationships between two individuals, each
of whose behavior has implications for the structure of the other’s
behavior setting. As Figure 4 indicates, bilateral contingency is a
reciprocal interaction of the three-term contingencies that govern
the behavior of the parties to a transaction or relationship. The
behavior of one party supplies the reinforcing and punishing
consequences of the other’s behavior; in addition, the behavior
of one party provides discriminative stimuli and motivating
operations for the behavior of the other. The meshing of these
reciprocal contingencies determines whether the relationship
between the parties is of short- or long-term duration; it therefore
determines whether one or other party will engage in search for
alternative arrangements.
Bilateral contingency was advanced first in the context of
the exogenous corporate relationships that mark the interactions
of the marketing firm with its consumerate and suppliers.
There is growing recognition that the firm comprises a nexus
of bilateral contingencies which potentially connect any and
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FIGURE 5 | Extra-firm bilateral contingency; Foxall (2020a).
all of its members. Among the most significant, however, are
those that link principal and agent. Such bilateral contingencies
arise in the case of shareholders and directors, directors and
managers, and managers and employees. Hence, the relationships
between shareholders and directors, directors and managers,
and managers and employees can also be interpreted as
bilateral contingencies.
Extra-firm bilateral contingencies
The dominant theme of the firm’s external relationships is defined
by the demands which its consumerate makes of it. The overall
aim of the marketing firm is to create a consumerate. The
“consumerate” encompasses the customer base of the marketing
firm, be it composed of an aggregation of individual final
consumers or a number of corporate customers. Drucker (1977,
2007) speaks of the objective of the firm as “to create a customer.”
A customer is someone who purchases a product or service in
sufficient quantity to enable the firm to fulfill its revenue and
profit objectives; and a consumerate is that aggregation of the
customer base that enables the firm, through repeat purchasing,
to accomplish these goals. More formally, a customer is an
individual or organization with which the firm interacts through
marketing transactions (objective exchange, whole marketing
mix deployment, pecuniary markets). Only firms (marketing
firms) therefore have customers and by extension consumerates.
Other organizations, even if they pursue commercial objectives,
have publics but not customers or consumerates. Building on
Drucker’s work, therefore, the objective of the firm – in the age
of the imperatives – is the creation of a consumerate.
The firm’s behavior is summarized by the three marketing
operations previously mentioned and described at greater length
in Foxall (2018, 2020a), namely, (i) reading consumer behavior
and preferences in the course of creating marketing intelligence
and (ii) translating this into a strategy that consists ultimately
in (iii) the provision and management of a viable portfolio
of marketing mixes. Hence, at its simplest, the behavior of
the consumerate acts as a discriminative stimulus for the firm
while that of the firm is a discriminative stimulus for consumer
behavior. More complexly, bilateral contingency analysis involves
the overt relationships between the marketing firm and a
customer, either a final consumer or a corporate purchaser
(Figure 5). The bilateral contingencies linking firm, stakeholders,
and consumerates include contractual relationships, e.g., between
the firm and its customers, or the firm and its employees,
and noncontractual connections among these parties, both
commercial and social. These latter are “mutuality” relationships
(Foxall, 1999).
The goal of marketing firms is to consider, create, and apply
marketing mixes that profitably satisfy the firm’s consumerate.
The components of the marketing mix (product, price,
promotion and place utilities) appear in the marketplace initially
as discriminative stimuli for the consumer behaviors of browsing,
purchasing and consuming. Purchasing, the exchange of money
for the ownership of the legal right to a product or service: such
pecuniary exchange is a source of both utilitarian reinforcement
(in the form of resources that can be paid out or reinvested)
and informational reinforcement (in the form of feedback on
corporate performance) for the marketing firm. The effectiveness
of Rm (managerial behavior) in fulfilling the obligations of
professional marketing management, specifically the creation of
a customer who purchases the product at a price level sufficient
to meet the goals of the firm, is governed by the generation
of revenue/profit and reputation for the firm (depicted by the
appropriate dotted diagonal line in Figure 5). This consumer
behavior (Rc) also provides discriminative stimuli for future
marketing intelligence activities, marketing planning and the
creation and execution of marketing mixes that respond to the
constancies and/or dynamic qualities of the behavior of the
consumerate (Foxall, 1999, 2014; Reed, 1999; Vella and Foxall,
2011, 2013). When looking at this particular level of interaction
between the firm and its customer base, managerial behavior
can be viewed as optimizing a utility function, comprising a
combination of both utilitarian reinforcement and informational
reinforcement. The firm is entrenched within a nexus of bilateral
contingencies and the management of multilateral contingencies
is at the center of its administrative task. That being said,
the firm is not necessarily coterminous with such a nexus but
it provides the nucleus of the network of interrelationships
among its stakeholders. Similar bilateral contingencies mark
the relationships between the marketing firm and its suppliers,
in the analysis of which the supplier assumes the role of
the marketing firm.
Intra-firm bilateral contingencies
The firm has been characterized as a nexus of contracts. In the
modern corporation owners appoint the firms officers, managers
who carry contractual responsibility to operate the organization
in a manner that maximizes returns to these shareholders.
Managers appoint (other) employees who are contractually
responsible for conducting those business operations that fall
within the domain of their assumed competence. These are all
principal—agent relationships. In addition, managers interact
with other managers and employees with employees in order to
fulfill their responsibilities. These relationships all fall within the
compass of intra-firm bilateral contingencies, a designation that is
capable of embracing both the contractual relationships involved
and the additional, “mutuality relationships” that lubricate these
contractual interactions but do not fall within the scope of
the contracts the parties have signed. This topic is important
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because of the argument (e.g., Singer, 2019) that while markets
operate in a manner that is consonant with the values of liberal
democracy, within the firm this is far from the case: managers
exercise authority and workers are exploited; in other words,
while firms operate within free markets their internal operations
do not abide by market considerations but reflect managerial
authority. If, however, the firm constitutes, essentially, a private
market, as the Chicago School argues, we should expect to
find that authority relations are less to the fore, if not entirely
absent (Friedman, 1962). This debate is not an integral subject
for the present paper, though the analysis of intra-firm bilateral
contingencies is of relevance to it. For the present discussion,
two assumptions are made. First, rather than behavior within the
firm being determined by authority relationships, it is indeed,
the result of individuals’ contracting together within a market
framework (see, e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Hart, 1995;
Singer, 2019). However, there is in practice a degree of authority
involved in the firm’s relations between principal and agent. The
markets in which individuals operate as employees are not so
smooth running as those between a consumer and her baker.
An employee or manager can always leave their current position
as per contract but an equivalent job is not necessarily to be
had elsewhere without incurring considerable transaction costs
(Larsen et al., 2020). But the principal-agent relationship is not an
absolutely authoritarian one either. Of course, Friedman makes
a good point: treating the firm as a private market makes it
predictable, his 1953 criterion, even though the smooth jobs
market envisaged requires many firms and competition among
them (Friedman, 1953). More extreme perhaps is the assertion
of the “property rights paradigm” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972)
to the effect that managerial power does not exist, that it is
simply a contractual relationship, and that the institution that can
direct the corporation is the market. This thinking does, however,
have some resonance with the imperatives of customer-oriented
management and the theory of the marketing firm.
We can designate the various linkages between firms and
between members of firms in terms of their (i) direction
(horizontal or vertical), (ii) contractual or non-contractual
nature, and (iii) being marketing- or market-transactions,
professional relationships, and mutuality relationships. Table 1
summarizes the possibilities for the marketing firm.
While extra-firm bilateral contingencies involve marketing
transactions (Figure 4) whether they are (A) from the
marketing firm to a consumerate or (B) from a supplier to
the marketing firm, and in both instances are horizontal,
contractual relationships, intra-firm bilateral contingencies (C)
are of various kinds. Those between shareholders and directors
(C1) are vertical, principal-agent, and contractual; those between
directors and managers are, similarly, vertical, principal-agent,
and contractual (C2), as are those between managers and
employees (C3). Those between manager and manager (C4)
and employee and employee (C5) are horizontal and of
themselves non-contractual. However, they may be enforced
by general contractual obligations, especially in the case of
manager-manager relationships based on superiority and hence
sanctioned authority. A and B are marketing transactions: they
TABLE 1 | Types of extra- and intra-firm bilateral contingency in the marketing firm.
Participants Bilateral contingency Type of relationship































Horizontal, non-contractual Professional (mutuality)
relationship.
are marked by the employment of a marketing mix that is
comprehensively employed, pecuniary consideration, transfer
of property rights, and competitive market-based pricing that
entails contracting. C1, C2, C3 are market transactions: they
are based on contractual relationships which in a competitive
economic system permits the parties to sever their connections
and seek employment or agents elsewhere. C4 and C5 are
professional relationships, based for the most part on mutuality
transactions which entail reciprocal consideration, interaction,
co-working, and co-operation. However, they remain ultimately
subject to contractual understandings. Disagreements at this
point may not involve resort to the extra-firm employment
market, however: there is no automatic need for an aggrieved
person to resign. Resolution may be by managerial fiat and/or
interpersonal accommodation. If C4 and C5 relationships operate
smoothly it is likely to be because mutuality transactions
work well. These are still bilateral contingencies, depending
for their efficient operation on the appropriate rewards being
available for work and on a system of discriminative stimuli
and motivating operations that efficiently signal the appropriate
behaviors in specific circumstances. These types of bilateral
contingency are depicted in Figure 6 which also illustrates how
the metacontingency that is the marketing firm is a nexus of
bilateral contingencies.
Shareholders, directors, managers, and other employees are
bound together by a range of mutuality relationships but,
essentially, by more formal bonds that involve inter alia contracts
of employment, legal requirements, and job descriptions. They
determine and regulate literal exchanges, e.g., of remuneration
and work done or investments made, and they occur in
competitive markets (often labor markets), at market-determined
prices. These are not, however, marketing transactions, since
there is no marketing mix. They may, therefore, be understood
as market transactions.
Although, as Coase (1937) famously pointed out,
incorporating as a firm overcomes some of the costs of
transacting in the marketplace (searching for information,
for suppliers, negotiating and policing contracts), there are
administrative costs that arise when the owners or senior
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FIGURE 6 | The marketing firm as the hub of a nexus of intra- and extra-firm
bilateral contingencies; Foxall (in preparation).
BOX 4 | Meaning of “market transaction”
A market transaction is a (i) contractual relationship which is legally governed,
taking pace in a (ii) competitive market, and involving (iii) market
prices/incomes. It does not involve the use of the marketing mix, however,
and so is distinct from a marketing transaction (Foxall, in preparation).
management, including the directors, of a firm are called upon to
exercise control of the activities of the firm’s employees. The costs
associated with this process include those of incentivization,
information, and communication (Posner, 2014, p. 534): the
employee in this situation is not paid in direct proportion
to what he produces and thus has no incentive to reduce
the costs incurred by his labor – he may moreover actively
freeload on his co-workers; the employees are unaware of the
prices paid for the resources they use, knowledge of which
would tend to dictate the most profitable usages of such
resources; the issuing of orders by top management and the
monitoring of subsequent production requires an effective
two-way means of communication. The costs involved in
these activities in which the principal (shareholder, director,
manager) seeks to maximize the efficiency of the agents
(managers, employees) through whom the wishes of the
principal are effected are known as agency costs; they are mainly
incurred in the effort to maintain agents’ loyalty (Dnes, 2018;
Zamir and Teichman, 2018).
The marketing firm stands at the hub of a metacontingency
which embraces also the firm’s suppliers and its consumerate
(Figure 6). Only the relationships included in the central
entity marked by the heavier dotted lines comprise the firm,
especially as it is legally defined. Organizationally, however,
the boundaries of the firm are porous (Minkes and Foxall,
1982). The intra-firm bilateral contingencies brought into play
by consideration of agency costs depicted as C1, C2, and C3
in Table 1 and Figure 6 are of this kind. They are vertical
relationships that are at some level contractual, though the
principal may not always be the direct party to the agent’s




The Nature of the Charitable
Organization
A charity is an organization that has the purpose of bringing
about public benefit. A firm, by contrast, exists in order to benefit
particular groups of people: its owners, directors, managers,
employees and, in order to benefit these stakeholder groups, its
customers. Even an organizations that exists to secure a more
general benefit than this, such as a co-operative, is not a charity
because it exists for the benefit of its members, a circumscribed
goal that excludes much of the public. The sphere of operations of
charities is specified in an English legal case of 1891, Income Tax
Special Purposes Commission v. Pensel in which a charity is legally
a trust for the relief of poverty, or the advancement of education,
or for the advancement of religion, or finally for other purposes
beneficial to the community (Gillard and Semple, 2018).
In the United Kingdom, for instance, a charity may have
a variety of legal structures, existing as either a charitable
incorporated organization, a charitable company that is limited
by guarantee, an unincorporated association, or as a trust
(Gov.UK, 2014). Internationally, charities come in many forms
and seek to achieve diverse goals within the general rubric of
being for the public good (Anheier, 2014). This account is,
therefore, general in character. The questions it asks are not what
does this or that specific charitable organization aim to do? but
what is the goal of the charity as a whole in relation to the goals
of its members? And in this regard how does it differ from the
marketing firm? Not what does this or that specific charity do?
what are its functions? but are charities capable of marketing-
oriented management in the sense that this describes the firm?
Not how is this or that charity organized? but how do the intra-
organizational relationships among the various roles compare
with those that typically describe the personal interactions within
the firm? Finally, not what does the charitable organization
achieve? but does the charity have a kind of output over and above
the combined achievements of its various participants?
In economic terms, what serves to distinguish non-profits like
charities from other commercial organizations is their financial
structure: they are not allowed to distribute their profits or
surpluses and they obtain most of their income not from selling
products or services, nor through taxation, but through the
voluntary giving of those who belong to and support them
(Anheier, 2014, p. 70; see also Veludo-de-Oliveira et al., 2015).
Charities are clearly, therefore, not firms on this criterion.
Moreover, a marketing firm has an objective, constrained sales-
revenue maximization, which differs from the objectives of
each of its stakeholders, whose motivation is presumed to be
consumption. Hence, the marketing firm is a firm in Spulber’s
sense. It shareholders, directors, managers, and employees may
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well, as he points out, prefer that the organization pursue
an optimizing financial objective (profit maximization, in his
theory), but their particular goals are summed up in the word
consumption. The other defining characteristics of the marketing
firm are inherent in its definition as that organization which
responds to the imperatives of customer-oriented management.
Nonprofits, including social marketing campaigns and charities,
differ in several respects from marketing firms.
Implications of Goal-Separation
Preceding sections established that marketing firms uniquely
engage in marketing transactions, responding to market-
determined prices, competing with other marketing firms, and
employing the complete marketing mix as a unified means of
achieving consumer sales. In addition, marketing firms have a
clear-cut entrepreneurial or strategic process, responding to the
imperatives of customer-oriented management, and participate
in metacontingencies. In this section we are concerned to
establish whether charities (as typical of non-profits) can be said
to be either firms in Spulber’s sense or marketing firms in the
sense established in this paper. The goals of non-profits, such
as charitable organizations are coterminous with those of their
stakeholders. It is unlikely that anyone would volunteer to work
for such an organization, freely assigning their time and energy
to it, without implicitly and explicitly sharing its humanitarian
goal. Paid employees, in the even there are any, are also likely
to embrace this objective since it is likely they will receive lower
remuneration than they might elsewhere. Those who donate
physical products to charities clearly also share their goals.
What distinguishes nonprofit firms in general is that they
are not legally entitled to allocate any excess of revenues
over costs. Hence, as Posner (2014, pp. 537–8) points out, if
the nonprofit firm can be said to be maximizing anything,
it is clearly something other than profit. The theory of the
marketing firm comprehends this eventuality by assuming that
all firms maximize a combination of utilitarian and informational
reinforcement. It is clear, however, that nonprofits, including
charities, can face important financial challenges. Posner notes
that those nonprofit firms that engage in pecuniary exchanges,
for instance, may not be able to price lower than for-profits since
they still have to acquire capital in a competitive marketplace
(and, we may add, labor too). Charities, however, fall into a special
category because their capital and much of the labor they employ
is donated to them: they can thus distribute their output at a low
price or even give it freely to the recipients. The utility functions
of charities’ altruistic donors contain non-monetary benefits that
compensate them for the financial returns they could obtain by
investing elsewhere. This behavioral preference on the part of
those who donate labor and capital to the charity is central to
the form such organizations assumed. Moreover, Posner views
the donors to the nonprofit firm as akin to the shareholders of
the for-profit firm. He also suggests that if the donors are not in
control of the nonprofit firm’s board of directors and the board
is not in need of new donations, problems of agency costs may
arise, just as in for-profit firms (Posner, 2014, p. 538). Being an
employee of such can often be very similar to working for a for-
profit organization – a job is a job, a career a career. Those who
donate physical items and their labor to nonprofit firms may not,
of course, be pure altruists (i.e., those who give of their substance,
seek nothing in return and indeed receive nothing in return).
Donors may seek important informational reinforcement-based
benefits such as the enhancement of their reputation as altruistic
givers, the exhibition of the donor’s wealth, gaining publicity, and
perhaps thereby promotes profitable commercial interests. Those
who work for charities may gain self-esteem or pride, a raison
d’être, social status among friends and the general public, positive
self-references for resumés, and so on. In the case of religious
charities they may even seek salvation and a happy afterlife and
be rewarded here and now by assurance thereof.
Indeed, charities occupy an intriguing position in the matrix
of consumer organizations considered here. As Corry (2014,
p.5) points out, “The charity sector will never be like other
sectors. Indeed its special role means we don’t want it to be. It
is driven by a sense of mission and passion – few are involved
to maximize profits, improve share prices or earn as much as
they can.” A vital difference between charitable organizations on
the one hand and the firm and other consumer organizations
on the other is that charities do not seek to attain any specific
response from the publics they serve. There is no sense of
exchange; rather, there is a uni-directional acquisition (from
donors) and provision (to recipients) of a product or service.
Even religious charities are bound by this ethos, differing from
religious organizations per se which seek to inspire a response
in terms of conversion or membership from those to whom they
appeal (one cannot rule out this motive from religious charities,
of course, whose broader objectives, gained from the religious
organizations that sponsor them, may include proselytization).
By contrast, charitable organizations engage in a form of symbolic
non-literal exchange with those from whom they seek to elicit
donations but the relationship is one of mutuality rather than
transactive marketing.
Implications of Market-Based Pricing
and Competition
Charities are not firms: since they are non-profit entities,
they clearly are not profit-maximizers, nor yet sales-revenue
maximizers. Nor can they be said to practice goal-separation
since their corporate objective, the provision of free (at the
point of provision) aid to citizens, is identical to that of each
of their stakeholder groups. nor yet do they share important
characteristics with marketing firms. They are, in particular,
unable to practice full customer-oriented management since
their publics are identified and defined on the basis of demand,
which may come from a variety of sections of the population
which cannot necessarily be delineated prior to their appeal for
assistance. In particular, their provision of charitable service is not
governed by a price mechanism since it is unreservedly given.
A marketing mix includes a product or service,
communications strategies, distribution management, and
market-determined pricing; the marketing firm seeks to manage
each of its marketing mixes as a unified whole that generates
consumers and sales, understood as long-term buyers of the
marketing firm’s productive outputs and repeated purchases.
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The insistence of competitive market-based prices is consistent
with members of the firm’s consumerate having the discretion
to allocate their discretionary income efficiently among the
products and services available in the market-place. Market-
based prices are also capable of indicating to the marketing firm
the productive enterprises in which it should engage and those of
which it should divest itself.
Among firms and consumer organizations, only the marketing
firm unequivocally faces market-determined prices. Marketing
cooperatives have a large say in determining prices by
virtue of the countervailing power they can exercise by
reducing competition among suppliers and acting quasi-
monopsonistically. Hence, it seems that marketing cooperatives
cannot be considered organizations that are governed by
market prices. Some professional partnerships may operate in
markets that determine prices but others are regulated in what
they can charge by professional bodies. Hence, professional
partnerships may face market pricing under circumstances to
be delineated by empirical investigation. In the case of public
corporations, exposure to market price mechanisms depends
on the nature of any involvement of government or quango.
Similarly, in such organizations, entrepreneurial and strategic
operations may be limited.
Moreover, only the marketing firm unequivocally faces market
competition, though marketing cooperatives may well face
competition from marketing firms operating in the same fields
and, possibly, from other cooperatives, though such businesses
are usually geographically confined. Professional partnerships
may compete with similar organizations, though they may be
regulated so that they cannot overtly compete (e.g., restrictions
on advertising and promotion).
Implications of the Entrepreneurial
(Strategic) Process
Managing the strategic process of the firm is the central task
of the officers of the marketing firm and serves to differentiate
their endeavors from those of the managers of consumer
organizations. This management task is that of determining the
firm’s strategic scope, defined by the range of marketing mixes
the firm is able to support and the spectrum of consumerates
through whose service it can achieve its objectives of survival
and profit-maximization. Achieving a strategic scope that attains
these objectives involves the performance of three marketing
operations and each of these entails specific informational inputs
and decision outputs. These operations are the Creation of
Marketing Intelligence which consists in market search and
appropriate managerial response to reveal the potential (feasible)
strategic scope of the firm given its capabilities and resources; the
Formulation of Marketing Strategy, through which is determined
the planned strategic scope of the firm, namely the markets it
proposes to serve, the nature of the marketing mixes with which
it will do so, and the necessary diversification and innovation
this requires. This procedure decides the potential strategic-scope
of the firm and is based on detailed planning of the product-
market scope of the firm and its resourcing; and Marketing Mix
Management, in which the resultant portfolio of marketing mixes
is planned, constructed and implemented through its life cycles.
The outcome of this managerial activity in which the firm’s
offerings are brought to the consumer who decides her action by
buying or rejecting them demonstrates the revealed or effective
strategic scope of the firm.
Consumer organizations have no need of these marketing
operations in order to achieve their consumption goals. Unlike
the marketing firm, there is no need to respond to marketing
incompleteness. Their markets are given by the purpose which
originally brought them into being, namely the consumption
behavior of the publics they serve. They have no need of strategic
scope analyses and administration. A charitable organization
has no need of a profit goal of any shape or form since it is
either supplied by voluntary donations or publicly funded; it
is unable to deploy a comprehensive marketing mix because
it is not subject to a price mechanism and its “product” or
“service” is not exchanged in a literal or objective manner that
transfers property rights between the parties to a transaction.
There is no direct competition involved in its actions (indeed,
the only “competition” that can be envisioned within its sphere
of operations is that for the consumer’s time from all other
sources of activity in which she might engage – hardly a precise
definition). There is no reason why such an organization needs
to be entrepreneurial since its sphere of operations is given and
it has no incentive to innovate or alter either its offering or its
consumerate: indeed, there may be, as a result of its remit, strict
limitations on its changing either. There is no need to explore new
“markets” within a charitable organization. Such an organization
is neither a firm nor a marketing firm.
A major point of differentiation between marketing firms
and consumer organizations of all kinds lies in the marketing
firm’s incorporation of the consumerate in the entrepreneurial
process (Figure 7). Many business-to-business firms co-invent
and co-innovate with customers for instance; and many
business-to-consumer firms are also keen to use consumer
insights and to market test and test market along with
customers. The consumerate is an integral part of the
strategic process. On the face of it only marketing firms have
incentive and opportunity to include their consumerates in
the entrepreneurial process. However, although its scope is
limited in this regard, the marketing co-operative has restricted
ability to vary its product-market scope, pursue strategic
marketing, or marketing mix management. The question is
how far this reduces the gap between the marketing firm
and the co-operative in this context. Moreover, partnerships
may have some scope for this, albeit professional regulation
may restrict their scope (for instance, some professional
partnerships are restricted by their governing institutes from
offering services jointly with other professions). The difference




The marketing firm is unique in seeking to discover marketing
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FIGURE 7 | The strategic (entrepreneurial) process encompasses the consumerate. CMI, creation of marketing intelligence; FMS, formulation of marketing strategy;
MMM, marketing mix management; Foxall (in preparation).
management of a portfolio of marketing mixes that respond to
the realities of consumer discretion and consumer sophistication.
This is the mechanism by which it maximizes sales revenue
and earns the profits necessary to satisfy its stakeholders and
to reinvest in the business. As customer requirements change,
so the business changes by adapting its mission and sphere of
operations. The consumerate is the determinant of what business
the firm is in and, equally important, the firm is free to respond
by changing its strategic mission. There is no corresponding
impetus for the charity which is locked in to a particular
mission and function: to depart from this it would cease to exist.
Firms may diversify; charities, not. The firm is an instigator of
markets and marketing opportunities; the charity, a response to
a specific need. The firm’s success in carrying out its mission
is apparent from its levels of sales and profitability, dynamic
market signals that determine the direction and scope of the firm;
these attainments also put a limit on the activities of the firm by
enhancing or circumscribing its sphere of operations for instance.
The charity is limited to subjective feedback on its operations; it
has no market signals to propel it into new directions.
Implications of Organization
The relevance of bilateral contingency to the marketing firm was
discussed above. Here we compare the marketing firm in terms
of bilateral contingency with consumer organizations. Non-
profits are characterized by the relationships shown in Table 2
(in the case of charities) and Figure 8. Although charitable
organizations differ markedly depending on social, cultural, and
legal contexts (e.g., Chevalier-Watts, 2017), some generalizations
can be suggested. Crucially, what is missing from both the table
and the figure is mention of C1, which in the case of the
marketing firm represents a relationship in which shareholders’
controlling the directors, even to the extent of having statutory
influence. In the instance of the charitable organization, the
donors may as Posner suggests resemble shareholders and it is
true that in some circumstances they may be in a position to exert
influence and control. However, many charitable trusts came into
existence already in possession of considerable endowments from
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C5 Employee – employee Horizontal,
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Professional
donors which they retain. There is a strong likelihood that the
donors may be unable to exert any pressure on the board of
trustees or directors, and therefore on the managers, if no further
donations are required to ensure the survival and prosperity of
the organization.
Non-profits often and social marketing campaigns and
charities generally meet their publics through gift or quasi-gift
relationships. These are a not marketing transactions since the
consideration, though often involving physical products or legally
constituted services, are not paid for, certainly not at market rates.
Objective exchange is unlikely in these circumstances; nor is a
competitive pecuniary market likely, though there may be some
form of token pricing. Usually, however, there is some form of
subsidization, possibly by government, possibly private. There
is no market price involved and on those grounds alone there
can be no full marketing mix. The product or service involved
is provided freely or almost freely and it is on these grounds that
we refer to this as a gift or near-gift relationship. The supplier
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FIGURE 8 | Bilateral contingency: the charity; Foxall (in preparation).
might be a commercial firm, government, or a private donor. This
situation does not involve marketing transactions of any kind.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The marketing firm differs from consumer organizations
in four respects. First, as we have seen, in respect of
its goal separation, its having a goal (profit-maximization)
that is distinct from those of its stakeholders. By contrast,
consumer organizations pursue consumption goals on behalf
of their members; this is true of cooperatives, partnerships,
welfare organizations, social marketing campaigns, and public
corporations; second, by responding to the imperatives of
customer-oriented management, consumer choice and consumer
sophistication. It is, specifically, its responding to the imperatives
that makes the firm a marketing firm. Consumer organizations
have their mission set for them. This is especially the case
for public corporations and social marketing campaigns but
also for cooperatives, and some welfare organizations. They
are not free to shift their assets into serving wholly different
product-markets – admittedly not many firms do this, but
they are always legally free to do so. Third, marketing firms
are unique in engaging in marketing transactions based on
literal or objective exchanges of property rights, deployment
of the whole marketing mix, operating in pecuniary markets,
and facing competitive market prices. Consumer organizations,
by contrast, lack competitive market prices or do not employ
entire marketing mixes; moreover, the exchanges in which they
participate are often not objective, being at the most symbolic.
They are linked to their publics via bilateral contingencies but not
by markets. Finally, marketing firms practice entrepreneurship
through dynamic alertness to the opportunity for profit through
better serving existing consumer needs or by satisfying needs new
to the firm (e.g., Kirzner, 1973; Holcombe, 2007).
The result is a portfolio of marketing mixes that achieves
the objectives of the firm, its consumerate, and its stakeholders.
This array of marketing mixes generated and managed by
marketing firms constitutes an output that is over and above
the combined outputs of their members; upon the reception of
these marketing mixes by the market depends the firm’s ability to
achieve its objective. The marketing firm therefore participates
in a metacontingency. Consumer organizations do none of
these (Foxall, 2020a). Rather, they promote the consumption
potential of their stakeholders, namely the income, pecuniary
and/or psychic these individuals receive which increases their
opportunities to consume. Charities specifically differ in that
they may have the advantage of offering lower or zero prices
to their publics. The theory of the marketing firm, based
on a synthesis of behavioral psychology, microeconomics, and
marketing science, allows these differences between marketing
firms and consumer organizations to be understood within a
common framework of conceptualization and analysis. This
has important implications for how researchers view the
nature of managerial and non-managerial work in these
various kinds of business organization. Whilst we can treat
pecuniary reinforcement as both utilitarian and informational
reinforcement (as money or income serves both functions
in Hertzberg’s two-factor theory: see, e.g., Herzberg et al.,
1959; Herzberg, 1964, 1966), we must recognize that in
some consumer organizations, such as charities this may be
small or nonexistent. But as we have seen charity workers
receive income in the form of informational reinforcement,
the pride and so on they gain from participating. We
need the apparatus of bilateral contingency to do justice
to this, especially the concept of mutuality relationships as
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well as marketing transactions. The marketing firm moreover
is a hub of bilateral contingencies. Unlike most consumer
organizations it participates in a metacontingency. It has an
output which is over and above the combined outputs of
its members. Consumer organizations do not: their output
takes the form of macrobehavior. In addition, the marketing
firm, by definition, responds to the imperatives of customer-
oriented management by generating its profits by means
of the fulfillment of considerations arising from consumer
choice and consumer sophistication. As a result the nature
of managerial work in the marketing firm differs profoundly
from that of consumer organizations: the necessity of strategic
entrepreneurship on the part of the marketing firm is the
key. Finally, we can extend the theory of the marketing
firm by taking consumer organizations into consideration
with respect to (i) intra-organizational bilateral contingencies
(their incidence and strength) (ii) by comparing the marketing
firm’s participation in a metacontingency with the capacity
of consumer organizations to generate only macrobehavior
(iii) by introduction of the concept of multilateral contingency
which is capable of uniting analyses of the marketing firm
and consumer organizations. Further research might concentrate
on some apparent differences between marketing firms and
consumer organizations that call for empirical investigation.
In the marketing firm, for instance, goal separation imposes
a hierarchy extending from shareholders (owners) to directors
and then managers to employees. What are the implications
for the range of bilateral contingencies that this entails
for the management of the organization? What is the link
between the marketing transactions that make up some
of these contingences and the mutuality relationships that
support them? Is it the case that consumer organizations
generally have a much simpler and shorter chain of command
than marketing firms? How does principal–agent management
differ in organizations that include shareholders, directors,
managers, and employees from those that involve trustees
and directors, managers, and volunteers, and how do these
various relationships differ in terms of day-to-day management
and the monitoring and control of supervised organizational
members? A further possibility for empirical investigation
arises from a specific observation about charitable organizations
made by Posner and adopted in this paper. It concerns
the situation in which donors (treated as quasi-shareholders)
do not control the board of trustees, and the board has
no need to introduce new capital into the organization
(perhaps by virtue of the large endowments that were provided
when the charity was established), then agency costs are
likely to be incurred through a lack of incentive to garner
new donors or otherwise satisfy the charity’s publics. The
assertion is that directors and managers may therefore slack
off from the pursuit of high levels of efficiency as long as
the minimal goals of the organization are met; far from
being maximizers, they have become low-level satisficers.
Can we adduce case study evidence for this and also gain
some general idea of how prevalent these occurrences are
among charities?
In conclusion: there is great potential for further
research based on the discussion in this paper. Further
analysis of charities by a deeper investigation of their
objectives, practices, outcomes, and organizational structures
would be beneficial in increasing understanding of their
relationship with their markets. It is also recommended
that the analysis of consumer organizations is extended
by considering, in addition to charities, co-operatives,
partnerships, state-owned enterprises. These additional research
streams will add to a better understanding to consumer
organizations as a whole.
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